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The collapse in trade and contraction of output 
that occurred during 2008–09 was comparable to, 
and in many countries more severe than, the Great 
Depression of 1930, but did not give rise to the 
rampant protectionism that followed the Great Crash. 
Theory suggests several hypotheses for why it was not 
in the interest of many firms to lobby for protection, 
including much greater macroeconomic “policy space” 
today, the rise of intra-industry trade (specialization in 
specific varieties), and the fragmentation of production 
across global value chains (“vertical” specialization 
and the associated growth of trade in intermediates). 
Institutions may also have played a role in limiting 
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the extent of protectionist responses. World Trade 
Organization disciplines raise the cost of using trade 
policies for member countries and have proved to be 
a stable foundation for the open multilateral trading 
system that has been built over the last fifty years. This 
paper empirically examines the power of these and other 
theories to explain the observed pattern of trade policy 
responses to the 2008 crisis, using trade and protection 
data for seven large emerging market countries that 
have a history of active use of trade policy. Vertical 
specialization (global fragmentation) is found to be the 
most powerful economic factor determining trade policy 
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The collapse in trade and contraction in output that followed the 2008 financial crisis is 
comparable to, and in many countries more severe than, the Great Depression of 1930.  
Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) sum up: “...globally we are tracking or doing even worse than 
the Great Depression, whether the metric is industrial production, exports or equity valuations. ... 
This is a Depression-sized event.”  Figure 1 taken from Eichengreen and O'Rourke (2009) 
depicts, in parallel, the collapse of world trade following the Great Depression and the 2008 
crisis.  Trade fell far and fast immediately after the onset of both events.   
The trade collapse during the Great Depression coincided with walls of tariffs rising 
around the world as countries closed their economies to protect their producers and keep 
employment from falling even further (Figure 2 from Clemens and Williamson 2001). Strikingly, 
despite the trade collapse, the 2008 crisis and its recessionary aftermath did not fuel 
protectionism.  While the rampant protectionism following the Great Crash of 1929 was not in 
evidence in 2008-2009, this is not to say that there were no instances of protectionism after the 
crisis. Evenett and his collaborators (2009a, 2009b, 2011) have carefully documented over 1,400 
new measures that discriminate against foreign products put in place between November 2008 
and the end of 2010.  The data compiled by the Global Trade Alert and the WTO illustrate that 
governments did seek to use trade policy as one instrument with which to respond to the crisis. 
However, the overall increase in protectionism was limited. Levels of protection post crisis were 
not unusual in comparison to the years before the crisis, and are not in any way comparable to 
the 1930s outbreak. Noteworthy has been a decline in the use of measures such as antidumping, 
safeguards and countervailing duty investigations and duty impositions, “traditional” instruments 
used by import-competing sectors during recessions (Bown, 2010).  Equally noteworthy have 
been numerous instances of liberalization—many of the countries that were among the most 
active users of restrictive trade policies also tended to selectively reduce the level of protection 
for some products (Figure X [3]). The data reveal that countries can be separated into trade 
policy activists – pursuing a mix of trade restricting and trade liberalizing actions – and trade 
policy “abstentionists”. The most active users of trade policy include Brazil, China, India and 
Russia – i.e., the large emerging markets – which have used policy to both increase and reduce 
protection levels (for different categories of goods). Thus, the stylized facts of the trade policy 3 
 
responses to the crisis are that the overall level of protection did not increase substantially, that 
there was significant heterogeneity in the use of trade policy, and that this heterogeneity spans 
the direction of trade policy within countries as well as across countries. Moreover, developing 
countries, especially large emerging markets, were among the most active users of trade policy. 
The question of why the deep recession was unaccompanied by heightened protectionism 
has many answers in theory. One-way trade flows that involve exchange of final consumption 
goods in one sector for final consumption goods in another have gradually been replaced by two-
way trade in intermediates.  This process has accelerated in the past two decades as 
specialization has increased in response to trade reforms and technological advances. Trade in 
intermediates intrinsically discourages protectionism as it penalizes the downstream domestic 
industries that rely on these imports. In parallel, declining transportation costs have separated 
stages of production for a good across different borders.  Mexican maquiladoras, for example, 
perform labor-intensive stages of production of auto parts which are shipped back into the U.S. 
for further processing; Japan's exports to the U.S. involve goods that are partially processed in 
China. Since a multinational enterprise and its network of supplier firms often drive the supply 
chain on both sides of the border, there is no incentive to protect.
3 
Of course, although the growth in integrated supply chains may be a factor explaining the 
lack of large scale protection, there is still a significant volume of “traditional” trade involving 
exchange of final goods and products that are largely produced locally. Examples include 
agricultural and natural resource-based products. Such trade – as is trade in intermediates – is 
governed by GATT/WTO rules and disciplines that constrain the ability of governments to 
increase protection. These institutions have proved to be stable foundations for building 
multilateral trading relations over the last fifty years. Indeed, the proliferation of global supply 
chains itself owes something to that stability. Thus, the existence of these institutions is another 
possible factor that prevented protection from mushrooming around the world.  
                                                            
3 In Baldwin (2009), many contributors argue that the collapse in trade was triggered by the collapse of output 
(demand).  The exaggerated impact of output reduction on trade is ascribed to the growth in intermediates goods 
trade and vertically specialized global supply chains.  These fundamentally new developments in trade, absent 
seventy years ago, are the reasons why the trade collapse is faster and deeper than during the Great Depression (and 
why the recovery was as fast). 4 
 
In the case of OECD countries (high-income nations), WTO rules are particularly 
binding. These countries have all made commitments not to raise levels of protection above 
prevailing applied MFN tariffs: that is, tariffs are bound at applied rates. Moreover, applied rates 
are low on average, often around 5 percent or less. During the crisis there were no instances in 
which OECD countries raised tariff levels; instead these countries used instruments of contingent 
protection like antidumping and safeguards. Developing countries in contrast have much greater 
scope to raise tariffs as their WTO bindings are less complete and often involve so-called ceiling 
bindings that are far higher than applied tariffs. This “water in the tariff” allows countries to raise 
levels of protection without fear of retaliation by OECD trading partners. Any such increase in 
protection must be applied on an MFN basis. Insofar as they desire to target specific sources of 
imports they may use antidumping and safeguard measures. Thus, a question that arises is not 
just whether trade policies are used but what type of trade instruments are used. As noted OECD 
countries do not have this “policy space”—in this paper we therefore focus on the behavior of 
the large emerging markets.
4  
We use pre- and post-crisis trade and protection data to investigate the different 
explanations for (possible determinants of) observed trade policy responses. We find that the 
WTO has constrained the use of tariffs, despite countries having the policy space to raise them, 
but that measures of international specialization have a larger role in determining the use of trade 
policy measures. Given the higher productivity associated with greater integration and 
interdependence, countries that sever their trade links with the rest of the world do so at their 
own peril.   
In Section 2 we describe forces, based on both economic interest and institutions that 
encourage and discourage protectionism.  In Section 3 we describe the data and methods used to 
test hypotheses based on these theories. Section 4 investigates whether the influence of those 




4 From the data collected by the WTO and Global Trade Alert it is clear that OECD countries did not violate WTO 
commitments (tariff bindings), making any “test” of the role of the WTO as a source of institutional discipline moot. 5 
 
2.  Trade and Protectionism: Then and Now 
Macro-economic forces 
Irwin (2011) and Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) argue that the reasons countries rapidly erected 
trade barriers and tariff walls during the 1930s owed to circumstances that were different from 
today.  The array of government policies during the Great Depression of the 1930s, including 
high tariffs, import quotas, and severe exchange controls to restrict capital outflow and keep 
current account balances from deteriorating, were designed to urgently tackle the problem of 
large and growing unemployment. Countries that remained wedded to the gold standard became 
more protectionist than countries who abandoned the gold standard and allowed their currencies 
to depreciate.
5  This predominantly macroeconomic explanation for the rise in protectionism is 
consistent with the inexperience of countries with expansionary Keynesian policies, which 
became known much later.
6 
The great trade collapse that occurred between the second quarter of 2008 and the third 
quarter of 2009 was the steepest fall of world trade in recorded world history.  The trade-to-GDP 
ratio fell by a larger percentage than in any previous recession. The consensus view in Baldwin’s 
(2009) collection is that the trade collapse was due to the demand shock triggered by the great 
recession that began with the US financial crisis and spread to the world economy.  Chief among 
the factors that amplified the effect of the demand shock were the linkage effects of international 
supply chains (Bems, Johnson and Yi, 2009) and the growing income elasticity of trade due to 
new global supply chains and lean retailing (Freund, 2009).
7   
                                                            
5 The latter could, unlike the countries severely affected by inflations that followed WWI, and whose exchange rates 
remained anchored. 
6 In the 1930s fixed exchange rates of countries remaining on the gold standard led to real exchange rate 
appreciation and reduced the competitiveness of their products.  Today, countries mostly do not maintain fixed 
exchange rates and can and do use monetary policy. The main ‘macro-economic’ variable that is a source of trade 
tensions and may generate a danger of a trade policy backlash to China’s perceived mercantilism—claims that China 
is deliberately undervaluing its currency. 
7 Supply chains may actually be more resilient to trade collapses (Altomonte and Ottaviano, 2009).  Due to the sunk 
cost of setting up supply chains, firms prefer to adjust the entire chain along the intensive margin rather than 
extensive margin. They find that trade fell more along the intensive margin (value per trader) than the extensive 
margin (number of traders).  Possibly, large multinational corporations at the center of supply chains alleviate the 
liquidity constraints of suppliers, protecting their chains from finance shortages.  6 
 
If the trade collapse is indeed a result of output (demand) collapse, as is now the 
consensus view,
8 the use of macroeconomic policies are the best policy response from the point 
of view of reversing the decline in trade.
9 If countries are confident about their macroeconomic 
policies, then there is less asymmetry among countries than there was in the 1930s. The threat of 
zero sum trade policy games among countries that pervaded the 1930s thinking is present to a 
much lesser degree. Clearly the concerted expansionary macro policy responses taken by G20 
countries played an important role in the sharp recovery of trade in the second half of 2009 and 
2010.  However, the subsequent debt crisis has greatly constrained the scope to employ fiscal 
and monetary policies in almost all developed countries. Despite the impotence of 
macroeconomic policies, there has still been virtually no serious protectionism. This suggests 
other factors are at work.  
Intra-industry trade 
A substantial share of trade is intra-industry, with firms in different countries specializing in 
different varieties of similar products. A variety of reasons have been advanced for how intra-
industry trade (IIT) can motivate trade policy, beginning with Krugman’s (1981) demonstration 
of the gains from trade in the presence of product varieties. Models featuring domestic and 
foreign duopolies indicated that – unlike models that assumed zero-profit monopolistic or perfect 
competition – IIT did not necessarily mean freer trade, since these market structures allow rents 
to be shifted from foreign to home firms through strategic tariff policy (Brander and Spencer 
1984).  Even though the optimal action for both countries is to reduce tariffs, the unilateral 
incentive is for governments to use tariffs to play zero-sum games.  If tariffs are strategic, then, a 
positive correlation between IIT and rents imply that tariffs should be positively associated with 
intra-industry trade.  Jorgensen and Schroder (2006) show that an optimal tariff exists, below 
                                                            
8 Levchenko et al. (2009) examine the role of three factors -- global supply chain effect, compositional effect, and 
the credit effect – in causing US trade to drop. They find compositional effect (i.e. trade driven by output) caused 
50% to 100% of the drop. Schott (2009) also finds the decline in trade volumes among established trade 
relationships caused US trade to drop, implying trade should bounce back with output. 
9 The first best solution to the crisis itself must tackle a number of issues. In the same volume Krueger (2009) 
recognizes that global economy imbalances, and the low interest rates that resulted, were a key contributor to the 
crisis. Frieden’s (2009) political economy view suggests deficit countries will increase exports on the backs of 
helpful government policies, while surplus countries will be pressured by their exporting firms to maintain 
government support as foreign firms become more competitive.  7 
 
which welfare is reduced because there are too few domestic varieties and beyond which there 
are too many inefficiently-produced, costly domestic varieties.   
Revenue motivation 
A related, simple motivation for tariffs but a possibly empirically important one is simply that 
tariffs provide much-needed government revenue. In situations where governments are 
constrained fiscally there may be a positive relationship between tariffs and IIT, indicating the 
dependence of countries with weak tax systems on tariffs as a source of revenue. 
Intermediates trade and use 
Trade in intermediates accounts for over two-thirds of world trade.  The early models of trade 
with intermediates by Ethier (1982) emphasized increasing returns in intermediates varieties.  
The explosion in intermediates trade appears to verify the large gains from trade demonstrated in 
Ethier’s model. The rise in intermediates goods trade is a potential reason why protectionism did 
not increase. Downstream users of intermediate goods are naturally strong lobbyists against 
border tariffs on such goods, since tariffs only increase their input costs.  Car producers, for 
example, want lower or no tariffs on steel.  While the steel industry may benefit from an increase 
in tariffs, counter-lobbying by downstream users naturally restrain governments from imposing 
large tariffs on intermediates goods.  Within the Grossman-Helpman (1994) protection-for-sale 
model, Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2011) show how counter-lobbying by downstream 
industries controls the demand for protection by upstream producers that compete with imports.  
When downstream industries combine intermediate inputs using Leontief technology they will 
lobby against protection to upstream industries, whose output they use as intermediate inputs.  
Protection to upstream industries is therefore naturally regulated.  Tariff in industry i are 
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sector j’s total intermediates use as a proportion of its gross output.  zi is sector i’s inverse 
import-to-gross output ratio, ei is the absolute import demand elasticity in sector i and a is 
Grossman and Helpman’s political economy parameter indicating the relative weight 
government puts on a dollar of welfare relative to a dollar of contributions from industry lobbies.  
Across commodities, all else held constant, tariffs should vary inversely with the intermediate 
use-to-gross output ratio. Even without increasing returns as in Ethier, intermediates use can 
lower tariffs. With increasing returns in intermediates use it may be shown that there is even 
greater propensity to lobby against upstream protection.
10  
Vertical specialization 
In Ethier’s model each intermediate variety is produced domestically with constant returns to 
scale using a single factor. The rapid decline in transport costs that has occurred in the last two 
decades has allowed the production of intermediates varieties to be shifted across borders.  This 
implies even greater gains as countries begin to specialize in the production of varieties 
according to their comparative advantage.  Global supply chains enable multiple countries to 
contribute intermediate goods in stages, before the final good is delivered to its destination. This 
is a new development in trade. Johnson and Noguera (2009, Section 2.2) construct their example 
from how the iPod is produced: “The iPod combines a blueprint produced by Apple Inc.: in the 
U.S., with a Japanese display, a Japanese disk drive (manufactured in China), and assorted 
components of lesser value from Taiwan, China; Korea, etc. These components are assembled in 




10 An older literature has pointed out that the outcome of the political economy interactions can also be perverse by 
increasing the overall level of protection: instead of counter-lobbying the result of protection of an upstream 
industry may be that the downstream industry does the same. Current trade policy instruments often require that an 
industry demonstrates injury. The higher input prices following upstream protection will make it easier for the 
downstream industry that it has suffered injury. See Hoekman and Leidy (1992), The increase in 
fragmentation/vertical specialization has greatly reduced the likelihood of observing such outcomes.  
11 The example implies that gross bilateral exports incorrectly state the amount of value added by a country that is 
incorporated in its exports to a destination.  A correct measure of domestic content embodied in a country’s exports 
must take account of the production sharing that goes on across borders before these stages of production deliver a 
final good to a destination.  For example, if semi-processed Japanese goods enter Singapore, where a small amount 
of value is added before the good is shipped for consumption to India, then gross Singapore-India trade overstates 
the true domestic content (value added) of Singapore that is embodied in Singapore-to-India exports, and gross 
Japan -India trade understates Japan’s true domestic content that is embodied in Japan-to-India exports. 9 
 
Combining input-output data with bilateral trade data, Johnson and Noguera quantify the 
extent of multi-country production sharing today (their Table 5) by computing the ratio of the 
domestic content of exports or value added exports to gross exports -- the “VAX ratio”. Without 
trade in intermediates, the VAX ratios equal one, while cross-border production sharing reduces 
the ratio.
12  The bilateral VAX ratio for the U.S. varies between 0.57 with Canada (lots of 
production sharing) and 0.96 with Japan (not much production sharing).  The same ratio for 
imports varies between 0.62 (Canada) and 1.07 (Japan).  In general the U.S. VAX ratio with EU 
partners France, UK and Germany is around one; with geographically close partners like Canada 
and Mexico, and Asian partners like Malaysia, Taiwan, China and Korea, it drops down to 
around 0.6.  The same ratio for imports is of similar magnitude with those partners. Johnson and 
Noguera’s decomposition (their Table 7) indicates the following:  Japan’s exports to China are 
either absorbed in China or redirected to the U.S (as in their stylized iPod example) while 
Japanese exports to the U.S. are absorbed by the U.S. with little bilateral production sharing. In 
contrast, a large percentage of U.S. exports to China and Mexico are sent back to the U.S. for 
final consumption.   
These findings have implications for the demand for protectionism. If output is falling, 
protectionism cannot shelter a domestic market. Protecting a stage of production is different from 
protecting the market for a good with no production sharing.  Protecting a stage of production 
raises the cost of vertically specialized intermediates produced in that stage to the next user 
downstream, perhaps located in a partner country, and lowers demand for the output from the 
protected stage.  With cross-border production sharing, where stages alternate across borders 
(e.g. US-Canada trade in auto parts) there is even less incentive to demand protection, since it 
raises the costs of intermediates to downstream producers within the protected country itself.  
With large vertically integrated firms increasingly the norm, it is often the same firm that 
performs different stages of production.  It makes little sense for it to take an action that 
                                                            
12 Returning to the example, the “VAX ratio” should be much lower than one for Singapore’s exports to India and 
greater than one for Japan’s exports to India. 10 
 
ultimately raises its own costs. A simple maxim is therefore that the greater the production-
sharing, the lower the incentive for producers to demand protection.
13 
That said, the Johnson-Noguera numbers also imply the existence of a great many 
imports without any production sharing (e.g. U.S. imports from Japan and from large EU 
partners).  There will be a stronger incentive to restrict such trade and afford protection to import 
competing American producers. A trade war could result if partner countries then retaliated, 
since imports from the US are directly absorbed into their markets with little production sharing. 
In the case of developing countries the share of final goods in total imports is higher than for 
OECD nations and many are (much) less integrated into global value chains than more advanced 
economies. Thus there is significant heterogeneity across countries. 
Institutions 
The debate over the role of institutions like the WTO and regional trade agreements has focused 
on their impact on expanding trade (Rose 2004; Subramanian and Wei 2007, and Tomz, 
Goldstein and Rivers 2007). There has been less analysis of the efficacy and role of these 
institutions in keeping tariffs from mushrooming when producers the world over find their export 
markets shrinking and the competition intensifying. The prevention of trade wars like the ones 
that broke out in the 1930s is often mentioned as one motivation for the negotiation of the 
GATT/WTO.  Bagwell and Staiger (1999) design their explanation for why the GATT/WTO has 
endured on the ability of rules such as reciprocity and the most-favored nation (MFN) clause to 
prevent countries from re-imposing “terms-of-trade externalities” that were reduced through the 
reciprocal exchange of market access liberalization commitments. Terms of trade externalities 
arise from the ability of large countries to impose optimal tariffs. Such beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies, while benefitting the (large) tariff-imposing countries, can start a trade war in which no 
one gains and everyone loses (Johnson 1954).  Recognizing this terms of trade externality, 
countries negotiate to being down tariffs (and, doing so, internalize the externality).  Bagwell and 
                                                            
13 Baldwin (2010) develops a theoretical framework to analyze the political economy incentives that are generated 
by these types of interdependencies, showing that they produce pressures for unilateral liberalization and therefore 
do much to help explain why we have in fact observed significant unilateral liberalization of trade in recent decades. 11 
 
Staiger (1999) view the GATT/WTO principles of MFN and reciprocity essentially as rules of 
negotiation which make it possible for governments to internalize the terms of trade externality.
14   
Ossa (2011) argues that the WTO allows governments to internalize production-location 
externalities as well as terms of trade externalities. This argument is more in line with the role of 
the WTO in quelling protectionism motivated by a desire to shift production to domestic 
locations – a big reason why tariffs exploded in the 1930s – rather than for optimal tariff reasons. 
By making a foreign product more expensive in the domestic market, a tariff shifts consumer 
expenditure towards domestic production. The greater profitability for domestic producers 
induces entry into the home market and exit out of the foreign market. Because of geography and 
consequent trade costs, this relocation of production increases domestic welfare and reduces 
foreign welfare; the share of goods consumed by domestic consumers that is subject to trade 
costs is reduced, while the share of goods consumed by foreign consumers that is subject to trade 
costs is increased. The GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination make it 
possible for governments to internalize this externality by allowing them to negotiate rules that 
restrict their ability to engage production relocation efforts.  
Membership of the GATT/WTO can provide a mechanism for governments to deflect 
protectionist pressures from domestic special interests.  The need to abide by GATT/WTO 
commitments and rules can be invoked by a government as a valid reason for convincing lobbies 
that adherence to those rules as signatories to the GATT/WTO limits the policy latitude it has 
left.  This role of GATT/WTO rules as a commitment device is a core element of the policy 
literature (Tumlir, 1985) and has been theoretically examined by Staiger and Tabellini (1999), 
Maggi (1999), and, in the context of regional trade agreements by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1998).  Empirical support for this idea has been presented in Bown (2004).  Thus, even where 
the natural opposition to trade barriers (from downstream users of intermediates, by cross-border 
production sharing, by intra-firm trade within the same firm across country borders) is absent, 
breaking their commitment to GATT/WTO rules entails costs for governments—in part as a 
result of the threat of retaliation and the associated welfare costs; more generally because not 
abiding by prior commitments reduces the prospects than trading partners will do so.    
                                                            
14 Large importing countries may use their market power to impose optimal tariffs on imports.  This market power 
may be measured by export supply elasticities (Broda, Limao and Weinstein 2008).  We do not include export 
supply elasticities into our empirical analysis.  12 
 
GATT/WTO negotiations revolve around tariff bindings, which may be – and often are – 
much higher than applied tariffs. Only eight members of the WTO have bound tariffs at applied 
levels: Canada; China; the European Union; Hong Kong, SAR China; Japan; Macao, SAR 
China; Taiwan, China; and the United States (Messerlin, 2008).  A strategic reason for a country 
to negotiate high bound rates is give it the policy space to raise tariffs in the future. Even if 
bound tariffs are well above applied levels, tariff bindings and other policy commitments and 
rules such as national treatment, MFN and transparency mechanisms have value. They reduce 
the uncertainty confronting exporters regarding the upper bound on the costs of accessing a 
market. Such uncertainty will be reflected in a risk premium to reflect higher expected costs and 
deter investments to produce in or for a market – reductions in such policy uncertainty will 
increase the risk-adjusted rate of return and spur greater investment (entry), and raise welfare 
(Francois, 2001; Francois and Martin, 2004; Handley, 2010; Handley and Limão, 2011). As tariff 
levels fall such uncertainty costs become relatively more important as a determinant of the level 
of the fixed costs associated with contesting a market. Rules such as bindings, national treatment 
and MFN provide assurances that no matter what regulatory policies a government puts in place 
that affect a product these will apply equally to domestic firms and thus not affect the ability of 
the foreign firm to compete. 
Either way one looks at it – whether the GATT/WTO rules eliminate one or the other 
type of externality or provide a commitment device to governments seeking to escape the 
influence of powerful lobbies – these institutions help prevent trade wars which everyone 
understands are negative sum games and reduce uncertainty regarding the policy environment 
that will prevail in a given market. Thus, the GATT/WTO may be an important factor why the 
huge trade and output collapses in 2008 were not accompanied by an outbreak of protectionism.   
3.  Data and Evidence on (No) Protectionism  
3.1     Data 
We analyze protection data for seven countries: Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), China (CHN), 
India (IND), Mexico (MEX), Turkey (TUR), and South Africa (ZAF).  Other than the fact that 
all these countries are trade-dependent, they were chosen because (i) their WTO-bound rates are 13 
 
generally well above their actual applied MFN rates, allowing them trade policy space;
15 and (ii) 
they are users of WTO-permitted/disciplined instruments of contingent protection such as 
antidumping and safeguards actions (Bown 2011), as well as trade policy measures that are not 
yet within the purview of international rules.  An important reason for choosing these countries is 
that they are heterogeneous by any trade measure: some countries are members of customs 
unions, others are members of shallower types of PTAs; some countries keep their applied tariffs 
close to multilaterally agreed bound rates, while others keep their tariffs far below their bound 
rates; some are large open countries in the sense of being able to dictate terms of trade in specific 
goods, while others are small open countries; some are proximate to large markets while others 
are geographically distant. All have a long history of trade policy activism, driven by industrial 
policy, economic development and non-economic objectives. Consistent inferences about 
protectionism across these heterogeneous countries would suggest they could be generalized.   
The primary dependent variable is bilateral tariffs at the 6-digit HS level.  The 
disaggregate level is necessary for analyzing protection since tariffs and nontariff barriers are 
determined at the product, not the sector, level. The data are from the WITS database, which 
includes information on both applied tariff rates and the institutionally-determined allowable 
upper-bound tariff rates at the HS level. Specifically, WITS contains bilateral bound rates as well 
as multilaterally agreed Most-Favored Nation (MFN) rates (see Appendix 1). We shall use these 
as a proxy for the strength of WTO rules such as non-discrimination and reciprocity. MFN 
tariffs, tMFN, are what countries promise to impose on imports from other members of the WTO.  
If the country is part of a preferential trade agreement (PTA), it may favor its PTA partners by 
imposing lower – or even zero – tariffs that the MFN rate it charges other WTO member 
countries.  Bound tariff rates, denoted tBND, are what WTO members negotiate during 
multilateral trade rounds.  The bound tariff is the maximum MFN tariff level that a country may 
levy for that commodity. 
WTO members can and do keep their applied MFN tariffs below bound levels. Those that 
do therefore have the flexibility to increase applied tariffs while abiding with WTO rules. The 
commitment made by countries to these bound rates means that the bound rates are ceilings for 
                                                            
15 The exception here is China, which bound tariffs at applied rates. As noted above, Canada, the EU, Japan and the 
US are in contrast not able to raise tariffs as their applied tariffs have been bound. 14 
 
actual applied rates. Average bound tariffs in developing countries are three times average 
applied rates.
16 While the binding coverage (the share of tariff lines with WTO-bound rates) 
varies across countries, the Uruguay Round, which ended in 1994, has brought more uniformity 
and wider coverage in manufactures as well as agricultural products. The effectively applied 
tariff in the WITS database, denoted t, is the lowest applied tariff: if a preferential tariff exists, it 
is used as the effectively applied tariff; otherwise it is equal to the MFN applied tariff. 
Foletti, Fugazza, Nicita and Olarreaga (2011) argue that the water in the tariff is an 
inaccurate measure of policy latitude, that is, some of it is “smoke”.  If an unreasonably high 
bound rate exceeds the rate at which imports fall to zero, then the prohibitive tariff defines the 
upper level of the water. Preferential tariffs resulting from PTAs further lower the level of water 
in the tariff.  Our tBNDPRF measure accounts for the smoke due to preferential tariff commitments 
in PTAs, but we do not impose an upper (equal to the prohibitive tariff) on tBND.  Foletti et al. 
find that 28% of the world’s tariff water is smoke.  Despite this, they agree that most countries 
that desire policy space in their tariffs have it.  The policy space remains, on average, at over 
60% of the water.  tBNDPRF thus serves to properly limit the majority of applied tariffs.  
Table A1 in the appendix contrasts the seven countries with respect to their applied rates, 
MFN rates, and bound rates – as explained above, the applied and MFN rates differ mainly due 
to preferential rates for countries in PTAs.  The statistics in Table A1 indicate that protectionism 
does not appear to be a good characterization of the tariff policies pursued by the countries in our 
sample.  Of course, in practice many countries may respond to protectionist pressures through 
increased use of instruments of contingent protection such as antidumping and safeguard actions. 
We therefore also combine the WITS data with Chad Bown’s temporary trade restrictions 
database at the 6-digit HS level in order to examine whether nontariff barriers like antidumping 
(AD) investigations have multiplied after the crisis.
17  Thus, we analyze two dependent variables. 
The first is applied bilateral tariff rates, and the second is the incidence of antidumping 
                                                            
16 In the case of Brazil, for example, in 2008 the average bound level was 30.8 percent, compared to an average 
applied rate of 12.5 percent; for India the numbers were 36.2 and 11.5; Mexico: 34.9 and 11.2; Turkey: 16.9 and 4.8; 
South Africa: 15.7 and 7.6 (Messerlin, 2008).  
17 This is available at: http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/ 15 
 
investigations that were initiated (regardless of whether these led to a favorable judgment, were 
dropped, or overturned).
18   
In examining the role of interests and institutions in keeping the protectionist desires of 
governments in check, we use simple econometric models, first to check if the variables that 
support the theoretical arguments work as we should expect, and then to compare the 
relationship between the level protection and its determinants before and after the 2008 crisis.  If 
the relationship is approximately the same in the two periods, then we conclude that the factors 
that shaped protection before the crisis are the same factors that have held protection in check 
after the crisis.   
3.2   Did Protectionism Increase?  
There exist a number of avenues for countries to raise tariffs.  Countries that have kept their 
applied rates below their bound rates (t < tBND) can do so without violating WTO rules.  The 
“water” in their tariffs, the amount by which bound (allowable) tariffs exceed applied (actual) 
tariffs, provides them with policy latitude.  There are reasons why countries may not want to 
exercise this latitude. Nondiscrimination requires the new applied rates to be equally applied to 
all WTO members, so the protectionism is transparent to the more than 150 countries who are 
WTO members.  Disturbing the status quo transmits the protectionist message to trading 
partners, inviting a similar response from trading partners.  Trading partners whose own applied 
tariffs against the initiating country tariffs are below the bound rate, are likely to respond by 
raising their applied tariffs up to the bound rate.    
Did these threats keep tariffs at their status quo?  Table 1 compares pre-2009 versus 2009 
tariffs.  For each of the seven host countries (first column), the table indicates the 15 largest 
exporters to the host (second column) and the total bilateral imports by the host in 2009 (third 
column).  The last three columns indicate, respectively, the simple average (taken across 6-digit 
HS commodities) of (i) the pre-2009 tariffs (tpre-2009), (ii) the difference between 2009 and pre-
2009 tariffs (Δt = t2009  − tpre-2009), and (iii) the difference in difference between actual and bound 
                                                            
18 Research has shown that investigations themselves have a chilling effect of trade independent of the final 
outcome, in part because firms subject to investigations are required to post a bond to cover possible future duties. 
See Hoekman and Kostecki (2009) for a summary of the literature.  16 
 
rates: Δ(t − tBND) = Δt − ΔtBND.
19 Argentina’s applied tariffs on Brazil are zero since they are 
both members of Mercosur, a free trade agreement. Argentina’s average tariff on imports from 
China in the pre-2009 years (2006-08) was 12.05%.  During 2009, this decreased by 1 
percentage point.  The Δ(t − tBND) column indicates that the distance of actual tariffs from bound 
tariffs did not change much, only 0.53 percentage points. The Δt column indicates that large 
negative numbers are more frequent than large positive numbers.  India’s applied tariffs have 
decreased across the board as has Mexico’s. Tariff increases have been infrequent.  Among the 
few examples is Australia’s average tariff increase against Thailand by 2.01 percentage points 
(over a low rate of 1.71%).   
Countries may increase or decrease their MFN tariffs and/or do the same for their 
preferentially agreed tariffs with their PTA partners (e.g. Mercosur tariffs after the Brazil 
devaluation in 1998).  Whether reversal of preferences this is protectionism depends on whether 
one views PTAs as being protectionist in the first place. If PTAs divert trade away from efficient 
producers towards less efficient PTA-partners, reversing PTA commitments reopens the market 
to the most efficient producers.  Much of the research on PTAs has focused on whether they 
divert trade. Less research has been devoted to the important question of whether trade 
agreements are institutions that may lower the impact of protectionism.  PTAs can serve as 
devices that allow policymakers to commit to free trade and escape the clutches of lobbies 
representing import-competing producers.  Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998, 2009) show how 
free-trade agreements (FTAs) serve as commitment devices in the direction of free trade in 
situations where the impetus for protectionism comes from import-competing producers lobbies.  
By committing to an FTA, a government is able to avoid a large and dynamically costly 
distortion associated with the (mis-) allocation of resources for which it does not receive 
compensation by the lobbies.
20   
                                                            
19 Since (t − tBND) ≤ 0,  if Δ(t − tBND)>0 it implies that the applied tariffs approached their bounds from below, i.e. 
applied rates were closer to bound rates in 2009 than in years immediately before the crisis. Import-weighted 
averages present a similar overall picture. 
20 The idea here is that governments are responsive to the demands of protectionist lobbies, but the lobbies must pay 
the government compensation for the distortions that protection brings about.  Since the misallocation of resources is 
likely to be large over time (e.g. financial and human capital is tied up in sectors that use it les efficiently than 
others), and the compensation lobbies are willing to make does not cover the costs of these unpredictable long-term 
distortions, governments a loth to satisfy their demands.  FTAs allow governments a way out. 17 
 
The existence of binding PTAs and WTO commitments implies that other avenues of 
protection than tariffs need to be used if governments desire to do so, such as antidumping 
duties, countervailing duties safeguards, and other nontariff barriers (NTBs).  Using these 
measures is not unconstrained as the WTO lays out a set of criteria that must be satisfied when 
imposing such instruments. Antidumping investigations, for example, follow a prescribed 
timeline, and the award of AD duties occurs at the end of a rules-driven deliberate process.  
Judging by the number of complaints that are eventually successful in being awarded AD duties 
(Bown 2004), the process of awarding such NTBS makes their initiation less prolific than if 
countries were unilaterally able to impose such duties without a multilaterally agreed process.  
Bown (2010) reports that the number of antidumping and other investigations initiated as well as 
the imposition of duties during 2010 both declined significantly compared to previous years.   
What about other NTBs such as licensing requirements or subsidies which, unlike 
contingent protection, may be imposed unilaterally? The Global Trade Alert (GTA) database 
contains data on the use of such measures.
21 Table 2 indicates an assortment of measures from 
the GTA database designed to protect domestic producers. Actions since November 2008 that 
discriminate against foreign producers (classified as “red” measures) number 1,385 as of March 
2011 and include industry-specific support (guarantees; subsidies; tax relief; export credit 
insurance, loans, financial support to ‘green’ industries, etc.).  However, since the GTA data 
effectively begins in 2009 it is not possible to say whether these measures have greatly increased 
since the crisis began. What can be said is that the number of new NTBs of a non-fiscal/non-
subsidy nature imposed in the 2009-2011 period has been stable, with little variation year-on-
year. There are no estimates of the ad valorem tariff equivalent of these measures.   
Kee, Neagu and Nicita (2011) construct the Anderson-Neary trade restrictiveness index 
(Anderson and Neary 1994;  Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 2009) for 2008 and 2009 to assess 
whether the crisis caused greater protectionism. They find that in the aggregate, less than 2% of 
the trade collapse may be attributed to protectionism, and the rest to the output collapse. 
Examples of countries where particular tariff increases lowered trade include Turkey 
(agriculture), India (agriculture), Russia (manufacturing) and Argentina (manufacturing), 
Canada, China and Brazil. However, the drop in trade due to tariff increases was negligible 
                                                            
21 Downloadable from  http://www.globaltradealert.org/data-exports. 18 
 
compared to the trade collapse they experienced. Further, they find little evidence that increases 
in nontariff barriers like antidumping duties had an impact on trade.   
4.     Why No Protectionism? 
4.1 Variables 
In Section 2 we outlined theoretical arguments for why protectionism may have been held in 
check. We revisit the institutions versus interest-based arguments with a view to representing 
theories with measurable variables, testing their relevance to trade policy, and assessing the 
extent to which they were responsible for thwarting protectionism after the crisis. 
Institutions 
The influence of institutions is measured by the bound rate tBND. While applied rates t are 
determined by each country, they are bounded above by their bound rate commitments at the 
WTO.  Since the bound rates are determined in a multilateral negotiation they are taken to be 
exogenous. One basis for such a relationship is that the applied rate structure is simply the result 
of a linear formula applied to the bound rates.  In that case the regression should indicate the 
formula for each country, and there should be nothing left for other variables to explain.  The 
cross-commodity pattern of bound rates is largely determined by some tariff cutting formula 
referenced to a previously unilaterally determined rate structure (see e.g. Bchir et al. 2006).
 22  
Since the structure of bound rates reflects the historical structure and the political economy 
embedded in that structure, it may be expected that applied rates are also scaled down similarly 
so that the political status quo is maintained in the new structure of applied tariffs.  Accession to 
WTO rule is both, a commitment device that allows the government to commit to freer trade 
(and increase the welfare of its polity), but also to continue to satisfy special interests as best as it 
can within a regime of lower protection.  An applied rate structure that is a scaled down version 
of the original structure of protection achieves this goal.  If this is true, then the cross-commodity 
structure of applied rates should bear a strong relationship with cross-commodity structure of 
bound rates. 
                                                            
22 With respect to agriculture, this may not be true.  During the Uruguay round developing countries used their right 
to set agricultural tariff bounds without reference to historical levels by setting these bounds at extremely high levels 
(Hertel and Winters 2005, p 41). 19 
 
While bound rates form a ceiling for applied rates this does not mean that there must be a 
cross-sectional relationship between bound and applied rates.  For example, large deviations 
from the bound rate may occur if countries (e.g. India) decide to lower their rates in the hope of 
reciprocal trade concessions by their partners.  Preferential trade agreements are a chief reason 
for such deviations.  For this reason, we define a composite measure tBNDPRF which modifies the 
Bound rate whenever the Preferential rate is applicable:  tBNDPRF = tBND but replaced by tPRF 
whenever tPRF is applicable.   
Interest 
As discussed in Section 2, whether firms have an interest in protectionism depends on the 
structure of production. If trade is of goods that are mostly produced locally (e.g., horizontal IIT) 
the incentive to engage in protection is higher than if countries are heavily engaged in vertical 
specialization. We therefore construct measures of IIT and vertical specialization.  
The bilateral exports and imports data in WITS allow us to construct a popularly used 
intra-industry trade measure IIT at the HS 6 digit: product as: IIT = 1 −  |Imports-
Exports|/(Imports + Exports).  IIT lies between 0 (no intra-industry trade) and 1 (two-way trade 
in equal amounts).  We construct this variable at the 6-digit level so as to get a measure that 
captures trade in similar but differentiated products.
23  
We measure the influence of intermediates use by the variable IntermediateUse, the 
fraction of output for each sector that is used as intermediate inputs by all other using sectors in 
the domestic economy.
24  It measures the intensity of counter-lobbying by downstream users 
against protection to upstream industries who produce the inputs. Even without the political 
economy considerations (as in equation (1)), if downstream users are the main source of value 
added in the economy, any liberalizations designed to benefit them should lower tariffs on 
                                                            
23 Measuring IIT at a higher level of aggregation –as is often done in the literature – will by definition capture both 
horizontal and vertical IIT, as higher levels of aggregation will capture trade in intermediates as well as more 
processed or final goods that are all part of specific 4-digit or 2-digit category. 
24 This appears as ∑
aij  .  yi
yi
∞
j=1  in equation 1, and is measured using input-output use tables (next fn.). 20 
 
sectors whose output they use heavily.  IntermediateUse is constructed by aggregating the 
proportions across sectors (columns) in input-output use matrices from the OECD.
25  
Two measures of vertical specialization, conceptualized by Hummels Ishii and Yi (2001) 
and Yi (2003), and formalized by Johnson and Noguera (2009), are used. We use the most up-to-
date constructs of these measures by Daudin, et al (2011).
26  The vertical specialization measure 
VS is the share of imports in a sector that is used directly and indirectly, that is, embedded as 
intermediate inputs, in the country’s own exports. The second measure VS1 is the proportion of a 
sector’s exports used as intermediates by exporters in other countries.  VS1 measures the 
intensity of two sources of anti-protectionist pressure.  High tariffs on imports in a sector 
undermine the competitiveness of the sector’s exports that intensively use those imports.  Input-
output tables indicate that the same sector is the largest user of imports by that sector.  The first 
source of anti-protectionism is exporters of that sector, who will lobby against tariffs that raise 
their input costs, and make them uncompetitive.   The second source of anti-protectionism is 
foreign lobbying (e.g. Gawande, Krishna and Robbins 2006) by exporters in other countries who 
are dependent on the source country for supplying them with intermediate inputs. Low or zero 
tariffs in the source country are desirable for keeping their input costs down. 
The output-to-import ratio, z, has been popularized by the Grossman-Helpman protection 
for sale model; the output-to-import ratio measures the intensity of demand for protection by 
import-competing lobbies. Output determines the size of rents from protection; the lower are 
imports the smaller is the deadweight loss from protection. For each sector z is scaled down by 
the proportion of the sector’s output that is used as intermediate input by other sectors in the 
economy, to account for counter-lobbying pressure by downstream users as described in 
Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2011). The OECD input-output matrices used to construct the 
intermediates use data are also used to construct these netted-out inverse import penetration 
                                                            
25 The OECD input-output use data are available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/inputoutput/.  They are aggregated at 
the 48 sectors (OECD’s STAN system), which we map into ISIC rev 3 according to the mapping in De Backer and 
Yamano (2008, Table 2), and then into HS6.   We chose the closest available I-O data to 2005.  For the seven 
contries the I-O matrices are as of: ARG 1997; AUS 2004-05; BRA 2005; CHN 2005; IND 2003-04; JPN 2005; 
MEX 2003; THA 2005; TUR 2002; ZAF 2005. 
26 Guillaume Daudin generously provided the disaggregated measures, for which we are very grateful. The vertical 
specialization measures are constructed at the GTAP level of aggregation of 55 sectors, which are mapped into HS 6 




 27  Since the I-O matrices contain gross output, imports and exports for each 
I-O sector, the computation of z
NET encounters no concordance problems.  They are replicated at 
the HS 6-digit level of the tariff data. The full Grossman-Helpman measure z
NET/e divides z
NET 
by the absolute import demand elasticity e: the more inelastic goods are afforded higher 
protection because the deadweight losses from protecting them are lower. Import demand 
elasticities, estimated by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) for each country at the HS 6-digit 
level, are corrected for measurement error using Fuller’s correction, before using them to 
construct z
NET/e. 
We exploit within-partner variation (partner fixed effects) across commodities to make 
inferences about the influence of institutions and interest in determining the sources of 
protectionism. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 3. 
The relative importance of IIT varies significantly across the sample, ranging from around 0.08 
for Argentina and South Africa, both large natural resource exporters to close to 0.2 for China 
and India. IntermediateUse indicates heavy reliance of downstream sectors on intermediates: on 
average, over 70% of gross output of each sector goes towards satisfying intermediate inputs 
needs of other sectors. India has the lowest average among the seven countries of 60%.  Vertical 
specialization measures are significant.  For our sample, the country averages of VS are: ARG 
(0.17), BRA (0.14), CHN (0.31), IND (0.20), MEX (0.27), TUR (0.24), ZAF (0.20).
28 For 
Mexico the intensive maquila activity in the auto and auto parts manufacturing contributes to the 
high VS value of 0.385 for this sector. While primary sectors (coal, oil, gas) naturally have large 
VS1 values, manufacturing sectors do too.  In Brazil, China, and India these sectors have VS1 
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28 The VS measures for USA (0.15), S. Korea (0.38) and Singapore (0.64) indicate that large home markets imply 
smaller VS values. 
29 VS1 for some other countries are: USA (0.28), Korea (0.29), and Singapore (0.32). 22 
 
4.2   Results 
Estimates from a baseline partner fixed-effects model of applied bilateral tariffs that represents 
the influence of institutions and interest are reported in Table 4. They are intended to, first, 
indicate whether the cross-sectional pattern of tariffs accords with the theories that each variable 
represents for each of the seven countries, and second, to show how well the theories that the 
variables represent are able to explain the variation in tariffs across fine HS 6-digit commodities. 
The models perform well. Consider the first model for Argentina. The coefficient of 0.160 on 
tBNDPRF indicates that as the bound rate (adjusted for tariff preferences to partners in trade 
agreements) increases from 0 to 1, Argentina’s bilateral applied tariff increases from 0 to 0.160. 
One reason for the small coefficient, despite the availability of policy space,
30 may be that since 
the majority of this trade is carried on with Mercosur partners, so that competition from other 
partners is a non-issue. A quite different reason is that the Mercosur agreement has hastened the 
decline of inefficient industries in Argentine, which are no longer politically active seekers of 
protection, so that Argentina does not face protectionist demands from those sectors.  If the 
structure of GATT/WTO incentives kept applied tariffs in check, then the small coefficient on 
tBNDPRF should be the norm, and not necessarily a feature of belonging to PTAs. The row of 
coefficients on tBNDPRF in Table 4 indicates this is indeed the case – the small coefficient on 
tBNDPRF is the rule, not the exception, even for many countries that trade actively outside regional 
blocs. 
The coefficient of 1.751 on IIT for Argentina indicates that intra-industry trade is 
associated with an increase in Argentinian tariffs -- the opposite of simple intra-industry trade 
models that emphasize the additional welfare gains from expanding varieties would predict.  A 
number of reasons could explain this result.  Jorgensen and Schroder’s (2006) optimal tariff 
conditional on the number of domestic varieties produced may be one.  Brander and Spencer’s 
(1984) profit-shifting role of tariffs may be another.  The positive sign on IIT may also simply 
indicate the dependence of countries with weak tax systems, like Argentina, on tariffs as a source 
of revenue.  Since much of Argentina’s trade is with its FTAs partners, more revenue means 
imposing higher tariffs on non-PTA partners, even if trade with them is two-way trade in similar 
                                                            
30 Tables 1 and 2 in Foletti et al. (2010) indicate true water (effective policy space) of 15 percentage points in 
Argentina’s tariff. 23 
 
goods.  Brazil and South Africa also have positive coefficients on IIT, indicating similar revenue 
needs.  For China, India, Mexico and Turkey, however, IIT has a negative coefficient, in line 
with Krugman’s (1981) thinking about the gains from variety in differentiated products for final 
consumers that IIT captures.  Even though these countries also have weak tax systems, the gains 
from trade appear to overwhelm the need to use tariffs to for revenue motives.  Unfortunately, 
we are not able to more finely discriminate among these theories in this paper.  
The gains from expanding varieties for intermediates use within the country (Ethier 
1982), does deter tariffs in some countries. The coefficients on IntermediateUse imply that the 
damping effect on protectionism of intermediates production is striking for India and South 
Africa.  As intermediates use increases from 0 to 1, Indian tariffs would decrease by 4.83 and 
South African tariffs by 11.56 percentage points, respectively. Had tariff bindings not 
constrained applied tariffs, the same may be true for China.  Perhaps because much of their trade 
is within PTAs, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey either have small coefficients or a 
surprising positive coefficient.  The need to generate revenue may also play a role.  Intermediates 
users themselves produce for various consumers: they may supply to final domestic consumers, 
to final foreign users or foreign intermediates users.  Since the latter two measures are accounted 
by vertical specialization measures VS and VS1, the variable IntermediateUse accounts largely 
for final use by domestic consumers. Since they are “captive” consumers it is easier to tax 
producers who supply to them.  The positive sign on IntermediateUse may reflect the use of 
tariffs to produce revenues, but in a way that does not hurt the producers’ competitiveness. 
The extent to which vertical specialization, measured by VS and/or VS1, deters tariffs is 
striking.  While the measure VS does not deter tariffs in Argentina or Brazil – exporters in those 
countries may not powerful enough to overcome the need to raise revenues – the importance 
accorded to exporters in India, Mexico and Turkey is evident in lower tariffs on imports of goods 
used directly and indirectly in the exports of these countries.  This is in spite of their weak tax 
systems.  An increase in VS by 0.25 (approximately the country means) lowers tariffs in India, 
Mexico and Turkey by 6.65, 2.65, and 2.24 percentage points, respectively. 24 
 
The second vertical specialization measure VS1 produces a new finding about global 
supply chain as a force against protectionism.
31  The negative coefficients on VS1, across the 
table, affirm that home governments are keen to advance the interests of their exporters by 
reducing tariffs on the inputs used by (upstream) home exporters in order to enhance their 
competitive position with foreign users.  That these supply chains can crisscross the home 
country many times is an added reason to keep tariffs down.  The negative coefficients on VS1 
may also be taken as evidence for the idea that exporters in foreign countries may politically 
influence home tariffs since their competitiveness depends on the supply of cheap inputs from 
home producers.  One mechanism to achieve this is to press their own governments to bargain 
with the home government to reduce their tariffs; another involves direct lobbying of the home 
government. Since VS1 is closely related to multinationals activity with their affiliates and 
foreign direct investment undertaken by these MNEs (Hummels et al 2001; Hanson et al. 2005; 
Alfaro and Charlton 2009; Baldwin, 2010), it may well proxy those influences. For those 
reasons, the quantitative impact of VS1 is striking.  As the share output of Brazilian exporters 
that is used further by exporting firms in partner countries increases from 0 to the country mean 
of 0.21, Brazil’s tariffs decrease 5.953 percentage points.  Most countries in our sample have 
similarly large estimates on VS1. China’s, we hazard, would be similar if their bound tariffs were 
less constraining.   
The political economy variables z
NET/e inform about the propensity for protectionism – 
the inverse of its coefficient estimates the parameter a in the extended Grossman-Helpman 
model. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.046 on z
NET/e for Argentina 
reveals from its tariff policy that Argentina’s government weights a dollar of consumer welfare 
22 times as much as it weights a dollar of contributions from import competing lobbies.  The 
parameter a is estimated from Table 4 to equal 142 for Brazil, 111 for China, and 7.3 for Turkey.  




31 Near-collinearity of VS and VS1 is not the reason for opposite signs on their coefficients. Even if they are included 
separately (or individually), the signs for Argentina and Brazil are as they appear in Table 4. 
32  This is possibly due to the incorrect assumption that all sectors are politically organized, but we maintain the 
assumption and assume that a negative coefficient implies welfare maximization.  We also do not correct for the 
endogeneity in the regressor z
NET/e, which biases its coefficient upwards. 25 
 
The models fit the data quite well. For example, China’s tariffs are strongly 
institutionally determined. China’s tariffs move closely with their bound rates and the 
preferential commitments in China’s bilateral and regional trade agreements. Over 95% of the 
variation in Chinese tariffs is explained by the within variation in these variables, primarily in the 
institutional tariffs. However, the institutionally determined tariff bound is not the sole, or even 
the most important, determinant of the tariff structure for other countries. Though Argentina and 
Brazil belong to the Mercosur agreement, interest plays a large role in determining which sectors 
may or may not receive protection. The same is true for India, Mexico, Turkey, and South 
Africa. Even in China’s case, the interest variables are statistically significant implying they 
would hold their own in controlling China’s tariffs had Chinese tariffs not been WTO-
constrained. These findings are significant for the increasingly integrated world in which these 
countries will not just interact, but will define. 
Pre- and Post-Crisis 
In Table 5, each variable is interacted with a post-crisis dummy to ascertain whether the 
relationships observed in Table 4 remained unaltered through the crisis or were fundamentally 
changed by it. Change in the direction of greater protectionism should concern us, given the 
experience with the Great Depression. It is possible that the full trade policy response has not yet 
unfolded, and that the exogenous change in the variables due to the sudden trade and output 
shock will be met with a lagged response.  But trade policy did respond with rapidity and force 
during the Great Depression.  Therefore, we believe the post-crisis change in our coefficients 
contain important information about future trends.  Among the reasons why we think our results 
are of interest is the heterogeneity of policy responses across countries.   
Consider the coefficient on the interaction term tBNDPRF × I2009.  The negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for China, India, and Mexico indicate that even where tariff 
water allows policy discretion, these countries actually lowered their tariffs, on average.  South 
Africa, Turkey and Brazil, do appear to feel the pressure in the post-crisis period to raise tariffs if 
tBNDPRF allowed them the latitude.  In the case of South Africa, for example, the coefficient on 
tBNDPRF increased by 0.165 in 2009 over a pre-crisis coefficient of 0.10, signaling a readiness to 
increase tariffs up to the bound levels.  For other countries, the magnitude of the coefficient 
change is still small, considering the magnitude of the crisis.   26 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on z
NET/e  × I2009 for Argentina, 
Brazil, China, and South Africa indicates a lowering of their a parameters, that is, an increasing 
susceptibility of these governments to the lobbying dollars of import-competing producers.  We 
would expect lobbies to put intense pressure on their government to protect domestic markets in 
the face of severe price competition from exporters during a trade collapse.  Reassuringly, these 
coefficients are still small and do not signal a move to serious protectionism. 
The positive coefficient on IntermediateUse × I2009 for Argentina, China, South Africa 
and especially India may indicate that tariff revenue trumps the need to provide using sectors 
with cheaper intermediate inputs.  Heavy downstream users of intermediate inputs, but whose 
final output primarily supplies the domestic market (e.g. utilities, construction), may not deter 
governments from pursuing revenue by taxing the upstream sectors who produce these 
intermediates.  Since these sectors are captive, and may even be regulated, they may not have the 
bargaining or lobbying power of other downstream users who compete in the export markets.   
In contrast, users in the global supply chain face greater competition, and the quantity of 
use is far more price-sensitive.  Strong evidence of this is present in the coefficients on the 
vertical specialization measures: VS× I2009 and VS1× I2009.  The latter term has a large negative 
coefficient of -16.22 for India.  In the post-crisis period, exporting sectors in India’s partner 
countries appear to have had a strong influence on lowering Indian tariffs, specifically on 
products they import from India for their own intermediates use.  Keeping the cost of those 
inputs down makes them more competitive, in turn, increasing their purchase from Indian 
suppliers and expanding India’s exports.  For India, the anti-protectionist response of tariffs to 
VS1 has increased four-fold from the pre-crisis era. This source of anti-protectionism is also 
evident for Brazil and Turkey.  In the case of China, Mexico, South Africa, and Argentina, VS is 
the main source of anti-protectionism after the crisis: domestic exporters are the prime movers in 
demanding lower protection on imported goods they intensively use. Thus, though 
IntermediateUse has declined as a force against protectionism in India, China, Argentina, and 
South Africa after the crisis, vertical specialization via VS or VS1 influences governments to 
reduce tariffs. The new finding is that sectors whose output is used as intermediates inputs by 
foreign exporters have been further liberalized in Brazil, India, and Turkey in the post-crisis era.  27 
 
Argentina, China, Mexico and South Africa, on the other hand, have felt the pressure to 
liberalize in sectors where imports feed intermediates input needs of domestic exporters. 
A country-by-country summary highlights the heterogeneity in the sources of economic 
and political pressure on trade policy after the crisis.  For Mercosur partners Argentina and 
Brazil, vertical specialization has been the source of downward pressure on tariffs – VS  for 
Argentina and VS1 for Brazil.  Intermediates use domestically has also been a factor in Brazil’s 
case.  India has struggled with raising tariff revenue versus liberalizing trade.  Sectors that supply 
domestic users of intermediates (IntermediateUse ) as well as sectors whose imports are used by 
domestic exporters (VS) have been more heavily taxed after the crisis.  Foreign exporters, 
however, wield a strong liberalizing influence on India through VS1.  Mexico, in contrast has 
responded to domestic users, both producers and exporters, of produced or imported 
intermediates (through IntermediateUse and VS).  Although China’s WTO commitments have 
held their average tariff at a low level, the liberalizing influence of all three – IntermediateUse , 
VS and VS1 – is in evidence after the crisis.  Turkey, like the other countries, held steady after the 
crisis and responded by continuing its liberalization.   
Finally, in Table 6, we look at the incidence of anti-dumping investigations using 
conditional logits with partner-fixed effects. Previous investigations of anti-dumping and 
countervailing investigations have restricted their samples to only cases in which anti-dumping, 
countervailing and safeguards investigations were carried out. Here we compare HS 6-digit 
commodities on which antidumping investigations occurred with the overwhelming number of 
cases in which there were no such investigations.
33 Due to the lack of data, we have results for 
five of the seven countries. The positive coefficients on the applied tariff interactions t × I2009 for 
China and Argentina indicate they may have stepped up anti-dumping investigations after the 
crisis as a complement to tariffs.  In China’s case it makes sense that the restriction of policy 
space in tariff policy is made up by means of nontariff measures.  For Turkey , the positive 
coefficient on IIT × I2009 indicates that tariffs and AD were substitutes in the post-crisis period; 
                                                            
33 A feature of this model is that the set of observations with no within variation (for a specific partner) are dropped, 
because they provide no information for discriminating and estimating the logit parameters. The sample used by the 
logit models is therefore smaller. A linear probability model with the full sample produces near-zero coefficients all 
around because the incidence of AD investigations is negligible. We may be missing a sample selection model based 
on characteristics of commodities that make them prone to AD investigations. We leave this open for future 
research. 28 
 
perhaps the increase in AD investigations were used to pacify sectors experiencing reduced tariff 
protection. VS has contributed towards reducing the incidence of AD investigations in Argentina, 
Brazil and China, while there is some evidence that VS1 has contributed towards the same in 
India.   
5.     Conclusion 
WTO and PTA commitments constrain the policy space of member governments to varying 
degrees depending on the depth of the commitments made. With the exception of China, most 
developing countries and emerging markets have substantial freedom to raise tariffs. In practice 
however most countries did not utilize this policy space following the 2008 financial crisis and 
the ensuing collapse in global demand and trade. The protectionist outbreak that followed a 
similar collapse during the Great Depression was not observed in 2009 and following years.  
Why has this been the case? 
While the influence exerted by the WTO is in evidence, our analysis reveals that it is not 
the only limiting influence on countries’ trade policies. Despite the significant headroom that 
existed to raise tariffs in six of the seven countries in our sample, none used this policy space for 
greater protection in the post-crisis period. Our regressions indicate that the crisis did bring about 
increased demands for protections, but that the position of domestic and foreign exporters in the 
global supply chain exerted offsetting liberalizing forces in many countries. The demand for 
cheap inputs by downstream users, both domestic suppliers and exporters, and the demand for a 
country’s exports by vertically-specialized exporters in partner countries, exert countervailing 
pressure against protectionism, whether from domestic lobbies or reflecting the revenue needs of 
governments. Thus, the economic interest of users and vertically specialized firms that has been 
a factor driving unilateral liberalization (Baldwin, 2010) helped keep protectionism in check 
globally during the crisis.  The structure of tariffs in India, Brazil, and Turkey is influenced by 
demands of vertically specialized foreign exporters who depend on Indian exporters for their 
inputs. In Mexico, China, Argentina, and South Africa, it is the demand of vertically specialized 
domestic exporters that curbed protectionism. In Mexico and Brazil, users of intermediates who 
produce for the domestic market were an additional source of anti-protectionism.  29 
 
Different countries behave differently in their trade policies. But while this heterogeneity 
is an important message from our results, our main message is that the nature of trade today 
produces powerful incentives against protectionism. Certainly institutions like the WTO have 
contributed to it. Unlike the current literature, which focuses on terms of trade externalities in 
assessing the beneficial impact of the WTO, our results indicate that there are other, more 
powerful, forces at work undermining protectionism.  Greater specialization brought about both 
by the large reductions in trade costs and the integration of populous countries that has 
multiplied the scale of global trade drives this change. The biggest benefit of the WTO may well 
be that, by reducing trade policy uncertainty and having supported a decades-long process of 
multilateral liberalization of trade, it has facilitated the greater specialization manifest in global 
supply chains and the associated profusion of MNE activity that is now a potent force for 
maintaining open markets. We find little evidence that the post-crisis period is so greatly 
different from the years preceding the crisis that protectionism should be cause for worry.   
  However, monitoring reports by the WTO and the GTA also make clear that there has 
been a step increase in the use of trade policy post-2008, working to both increase and reduce the 
level of barriers to trade in specific products, and targeting both exports and imports. Many 
countries took actions to lower trade costs and the price of imports. Sometimes this was aimed at 
lowering prices of consumer goods (food); in other instances the aim was to support domestic 
downstream industries (industrial inputs). Disentangling the multitude of trade policy measures 
and their determinants (the underlying government objectives) will be a rich area for research in 
the years to come, helping to better understand the political economy of trade policy in a world 
that is increasingly characterized by vertical specialization. The same applies to assessing the net 
impact of the policy responses on global trade. The fact that bailouts and stimulus packages – 
even if they were designed to be discriminatory – were significant in size and number and most 
likely had beneficial effects on global trade is a factor that must be considered in any assessment 
of the trade effects of 2008-09 policies.   
The pattern of trade policy use reflects the reality of a more intricately linked global 
trading environment where countries are increasingly part of global value chains. This has 
changed the dynamics of the traditional political-economy of trade policy, where domestic 
industries and workers lobby for import protection. The changing nature of imports and exports – 30 
 
increasingly, intermediate inputs and re-exports – seems to have supported open trade. How 
robust (strong) this new constellation of trade interests will be is something that only time will 
tell. Global growth prospects are likely to remain subdued for some time to come. The scope for 
new stimulus measures is now much more limited than it was in 2008. A sluggish world 
economy and high unemployment rates across the globe, as well as inflation and currency 
appreciation in a number of emerging economies will increase pressure on governments to 
promote domestic economic activity. Recent hike in tariffs on automobiles by Brazil illustrate 
that open trade cannot be taken for granted. Continued monitoring of trade policy measures is 
therefore important. 
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Most-Favored Nation  (MFN) Tariffs: MFN tariffs are what countries promise to impose on 
imports from other members of the WTO, unless the country is part of a preferential trade 
agreement.  This means that, MFN rates are the maximum that WTO members charge one 
another. Some countries impose higher tariffs on countries that are not part of the WTO.  
Preferential Tariffs: Virtually all countries in the world joined at least one preferential trade 
agreement, under which they promise to give another country's products lower tariffs than their 
MFN rate. These agreements are reciprocal: all parties agree to give each other the benefits of 
lower tariffs.  
Bound Tariffs:  Bound tariffs are specific commitments made by individual WTO member 
governments. The bound tariff is the maximum MFN tariff level that a country may levy for that 
commodity. When countries join the WTO or when WTO members negotiate tariff levels with 
each other during trade rounds, they make agreements about bound tariff rates, not actually 
applied rates.   
Effectively Applied Tariff: When analyzing the effects of preferential tariffs on trade flows you 
will need to be careful with assumptions about which tariff rate is actually applied to a particular 
import. The importing country will apply the MFN tariff if the product fails to meet the country's 
rules that determine the product's country of origin. WITS uses the concept of effectively applied 
tariff which is defined as the lowest available tariff. If a preferential tariff exists, it will be used 
as the effectively applied tariff. Otherwise, the MFN applied tariff will be used. 
The binding coverage, or the share of tariff lines with WTO-bound rates, varies across countries. 
Until the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which ended in 1994, countries agreed to bind tariffs 
only on manufactured goods. Trade in agricultural products was excluded from the GATT when 
it was written in the late-1940s. Even within manufactured products, countries were not 
obligated to bind all tariff lines. During the Uruguay Round, countries committed to bind tariffs 
on all agricultural products. New members of the WTO have been asked to bind all 
manufactured tariff lines as well. The binding coverage varies by region. In Latin America, 
practically all countries bind all tariff lines. In Asia, the binding coverage varies from less than 
15 percent in Bangladesh to 100 percent in Mongolia.   32 
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Figure 3: Number of new trade measures, end 2008‐March 2011  ‐ 
Liberalizing 
RestrictiveHost Partner 2009 Imports t Δ t Δ(t -t MFN) Δ(t -t BND)
($ Mn.) (applied)
ARG BRA 9,904,532         0.00 0.00 0.58 0.09
ARG USA 4,465,682         11.02 -0.77 0.00 -0.19
ARG CHN 3,488,877         12.06 -1.00 0.00 -0.53
ARG DEU 1,904,472         10.68 -0.33 0.00 0.01
ARG MEX 841,505            6.93 -1.93 -1.75 -1.91
ARG JPN 798,902            11.66 -0.29 0.00 0.04
ARG ITA 777,473            11.89 -0.91 0.00 -0.30
ARG FRA 770,788            11.86 -0.49 0.00 0.11
ARG ESP 753,847            12.00 -0.67 0.00 -0.21
ARG PRY 685,500            0.07 -0.07 1.50 0.39
ARG CHL 577,868            0.81 -0.54 -0.17 -0.27
ARG KOR 549,857            13.43 -0.79 0.00 -0.27
ARG UNS 389,026            12.12 -0.04 0.00 0.41
ARG THA 361,769            14.70 -0.68 0.00 -0.28
ARG CHE 361,091            11.09 -0.22 0.00 0.37
BRA USA 17,100,000       12.96 1.01 0.00 0.97
BRA CHN 11,200,000       14.23 1.30 0.00 1.32
BRA ARG 9,870,029         0.00 0.00 -1.08 0.14
BRA DEU 8,790,500         12.56 0.66 0.00 0.62
BRA NGA 4,721,049         13.95 -1.71 -0.04 0.08
BRA JPN 4,520,785         12.91 0.40 0.00 0.48
BRA KOR 3,340,994         14.58 1.20 -0.01 1.25
BRA ITA 3,292,578         13.91 1.26 0.00 1.21
BRA FRA 3,274,976         13.42 0.99 0.00 1.05
BRA CHL 2,541,617         0.53 -0.28 -0.84 -0.50
BRA MEX 2,255,538         9.01 0.43 -0.10 0.12
BRA GBR 1,822,868         12.73 0.67 0.00 0.51
BRA CHE 1,766,936         12.96 0.44 0.00 0.47
BRA ESP 1,757,484         13.50 1.14 0.00 0.95
BRA BOL 1,646,438         0.17 -0.11 1.39 0.91
CHN JPN 101,000,000     9.71 -0.18 0.00 -0.18
CHN KOR 66,700,000       9.52 -0.67 -0.55 -0.74
CHN USA 63,600,000       9.77 -0.22 0.00 -0.18
CHN DEU 51,700,000       9.65 -0.19 0.00 -0.18
CHN TWN 51,200,000       9.58 -0.01 0.00 -0.16
CHN CHN 48,000,000       9.88 -0.86 -0.61 -0.77
CHN AUS 38,800,000       9.60 -0.12 0.00 -0.21
CHN BRA 27,700,000       8.71 -0.01 0.00 -0.25
CHN SAU 23,300,000       9.53 -0.35 0.00 -0.33
CHN RUS 18,400,000       7.35 0.28 0.00 -0.19
Table 1: Pre- versus Post-2009 tariffs.  By partner (top 15 partners by 2009 imports)
Simple Average
(pre and post-2009 difference)Host Partner 2009 Imports t Δ t Δ(t -t MFN) Δ(t -t BND)
($ Mn.) (applied)
Simple Average
(pre and post-2009 difference)
CHN AGO 14,700,000       3.24 1.04 0.00 -0.62
CHN MYS 13,300,000       6.90 -4.38 -4.36 -4.54
CHN IND 13,200,000       9.48 -0.77 -0.64 -0.80
CHN THA 13,100,000       7.11 -4.27 -4.09 -4.28
CHN IRN 12,900,000       8.00 -0.50 0.00 -0.33
IND ARE 18,200,000       10.80 -0.14 0.00 0.96
IND CHN 17,800,000       14.21 -4.33 0.00 -3.18
IND USA 12,800,000       10.24 0.18 0.00 0.28
IND DEU 7,549,263         14.52 -4.21 0.00 -3.45
IND BEL 4,962,402         13.26 -3.92 0.00 -4.62
IND KOR 4,734,314         13.81 -4.62 0.09 -7.46
IND JPN 4,619,368         13.72 -4.33 0.00 -3.38
IND HKG 4,416,966         14.67 -5.47 0.00 -3.69
IND FRA 3,451,474         14.76 -4.61 0.00 -4.17
IND GBR 3,181,521         10.61 -0.04 0.00 0.56
IND ITA 2,935,895         14.96 -4.61 0.00 -4.47
IND SGP 2,862,321         12.98 -5.16 -1.48 -5.50
IND BRA 2,389,710         13.54 -3.55 0.00 -3.45
IND ZAF 2,290,508         15.15 -4.13 0.00 -4.86
IND THA 2,061,318         10.36 0.02 -0.07 0.31
MEX USA 88,800,000       0.02 0.23 2.70 0.19
MEX CHN 20,100,000       13.32 -2.64 0.00 -2.63
MEX DEU 8,777,437         1.43 -1.11 1.93 -1.08
MEX JPN 8,751,149         9.54 -5.11 -2.01 -5.07
MEX KOR 7,863,543         13.85 -3.00 0.00 -2.91
MEX CAN 5,488,370         0.12 -0.01 2.74 -0.04
MEX BRA 2,757,817         10.43 -2.63 0.56 -2.63
MEX ITA 2,596,180         1.49 -1.13 1.32 -1.16
MEX TWN 2,546,733         13.88 -2.94 0.00 -2.91
MEX ESP 2,232,401         1.60 -1.14 1.30 -1.11
MEX FRA 1,962,919         1.65 -1.11 1.71 -1.17
MEX GBR 1,541,341         1.39 -1.07 1.88 -1.10
MEX CHL 1,293,292         2.60 -2.41 0.48 -2.17
MEX CHE 1,093,640         5.02 -4.50 -1.69 -4.42
MEX MYS 987,759            14.95 -3.10 0.00 -3.15
TUR DEU 12,200,000       1.11 0.34 -0.02 -0.43
TUR CHN 8,702,965         2.75 0.10 0.03 0.59
TUR RUS 8,029,761         2.60 -0.12 0.05 -1.21
TUR USA 7,194,160         4.92 0.46 0.00 0.57
TUR ITA 6,379,579         0.85 0.45 0.08 0.22
TUR FRA 6,208,933         1.15 0.43 0.03 0.37
TUR ESP 3,416,477         0.82 0.13 -0.09 0.79Host Partner 2009 Imports t Δ t Δ(t -t MFN) Δ(t -t BND)
($ Mn.) (applied)
Simple Average
(pre and post-2009 difference)
TUR GBR 3,018,578         0.71 0.33 -0.02 -0.01
TUR KOR 2,454,631         4.12 -0.01 0.00 0.13
TUR UKR 2,428,488         5.73 -0.29 -0.20 2.32
TUR JPN 2,413,586         3.80 0.45 0.00 -0.32
TUR BEL 2,040,077         0.87 0.12 0.01 0.08
TUR NLD 2,016,612         1.36 0.29 -0.13 -0.08
TUR CHE 1,837,686         0.55 0.21 -0.23 -0.85
TUR IRN 1,783,694         2.79 0.80 0.00 2.83
ZAF CHN 5,763,520         9.02 0.10 0.00 0.47
ZAF DEU 5,145,031         4.10 -0.98 -0.73 -0.05
ZAF USA 4,192,728         8.32 -0.09 0.00 0.87
ZAF SAU 2,962,364         16.91 2.21 0.00 0.40
ZAF IRN 2,592,846         8.26 -1.41 0.00 -1.04
ZAF GBR 1,953,679         4.54 -0.90 -1.00 -0.40
ZAF JPN 1,890,614         7.30 -0.09 0.00 0.10
ZAF NGA 1,827,640         13.28 1.84 0.00 -1.69
ZAF FRA 1,595,282         4.84 -0.95 -1.11 -0.41
ZAF ITA 1,411,378         5.03 -0.91 -1.06 -0.68
ZAF AGO 1,369,714         0.05 -0.05 1.82 2.51
ZAF IND 1,033,003         10.02 0.26 0.00 0.81
ZAF AUS 960,803            9.48 0.43 0.00 0.68
ZAF THA 896,607            12.59 0.88 0.00 0.61
ZAF SWE 806,043            4.07 -1.07 -0.94 -0.54
Notes:
1. Data from WITS/TRAINS. 6-digit HS level. All sectors.
2.  Data for all countries pooled across 2006-2009, except:
     India: 2005, 2008, 2009; Mexico 2005-06, 2008, 2009; Turkey 2005-06, 2008, 2009.# "Red" Measure 
NTB Measure Implementations




Export taxes or restriction 82
Import ban 17
Import subsidy 1
Intellectual property protection 3
Investment measure 26
Local content requirement 22
Migration measure 34
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 46
Other service sector measure 11
Public procurement 33
Quota (including tariff rate quotas) 11
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure 15
State trading enterprise 8
State-controlled company 9
Sub-national government measure 1
Tariff measure 165
Technical Barrier to Trade 7




1.  Source: Global Trade Alert Database
2.  Measures classified as "red" are implemented state measures that 
    "almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests".
Table 2:  Unilateral Nontariff Measures
(since November 1, 2009)mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
t  10.185 7.253 12.734 7.471 8.786 6.069 11.889 12.085 7.114 9.721 2.660 11.266 12.605 12.639
t BND 31.601 6.228 30.631 6.865 9.665 6.130 38.052 26.123 35.023 3.514 20.212 20.069 27.652 24.119
t BNDPRF 26.990 12.324 27.706 10.831 8.964 6.136 36.594 26.312 16.475 17.002 8.372 18.610 21.887 24.342
IIT 0.075 0.196 0.104 0.223 0.197 0.276 0.181 0.274 0.079 0.198 0.132 0.243 0.085 0.206
IntermediateUse 0.774 0.263 0.638 0.268 0.771 0.278 0.604 0.282 0.777 0.294 0.757 0.317 0.684 0.311
VS 0.290 0.085 0.166 0.054 0.266 0.059 0.257 0.075 0.266 0.138 0.291 0.077 0.192 0.049
VS1 0.206 0.090 0.210 0.097 0.226 0.097 0.236 0.082 0.125 0.076 0.220 0.068 0.206 0.111
z
NET/ e 2.677 11.521 5.646 19.456 3.439 6.133 4.962 12.518 0.984 4.047 1.865 5.515 2.489 5.863
e 1.222 0.494 1.302 0.517 1.212 0.443 1.362 0.565 1.126 0.394 1.080 0.386 1.174 0.419
1/e 1.170 1.781 1.163 1.973 1.085 1.457 1.096 1.768 1.129 1.407 1.226 1.491 1.207 1.856
Note:
1. Sample organized bilaterally for each country.  Only large partners included  (Imports from partner > $ 750 Mn. in 2009). 
2.  Data for all countries pooled across 2006-2009, except: India: 2005, 2008, 2009; Mexico 2005-06, 2008, 2009; Turkey 2005-06, 2008, 2009.
     Sample size: ARG: 145642; BRA: 199533; CHN: 275344; IND: 75930; MEX: 232019; TUR: 91401; ZAF: 119400.
Variable 
t  Applied Tariff at HS-6 digits. Percentage points. Source: WITS database.
t BND Bound Tariff Rate, replaced by at HS-6 digits.   Percentage points. Source: WITS database.
t BNDPRF Bound Tariff Rate replaced by Preferred Tariff Rate where prevalent (at HS-6 digits).  Percentage points. Source: WITS.
IIT Bilateral intra-industry trade:   IIT=1 −  |Imports-Exports|/(Imports + Exports). HS 6 digits. Source: WITS database.
IntermediateUse Fraction of output used as intermediates inputs by all other sectors (see eq. (1)).
         Source: UNCTAD Input-output data (aggregated at 48 sectors).
VS Vertical Specialization Measure 1:  % of output used as intermediates by exporters in the same country  (VS in Daudin et al. 2011)
         Constructed at GTAP aggregation of 55 input-output sectors, then mapped into HS 6 digits.
VS1 Vertical Specialization Measure 2:  % of output used as inermediates by exporters in all countries (VS1 in Daudin et al. 2011)
         Constructed at GTAP aggregation of 55 input-output sectors, then mapped into HS 6 digits.
e Absolute import demand elasticity. Estimated at 6-digit HS level using panel data from 1988-2002.  (Source: Kee et al. 2009).
        Adjusted for measurement error using Fuller (1986) 
z Output-to-imports ratio.  Measured at 4-digit ISIC rev. 3 level.
z
NET Net-output-to-imports ratio, where output is net of what is used as intermediates inputs by all other sectors (see eq. (1)).
         Uses IntermediatesUse to calulate net output. 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics
ARG BRA CHN MEX TUR ZAF INDARG BRA CHN IND MEX TUR ZAF
t BNDPRF  (+) 0.160*** 0.269*** 0.961*** 0.218*** 0.169*** 0.402*** 0.113***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.0004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
IIT  (−) 1.751*** 1.215*** −0.0163* −0.381*** −0.490*** −1.148*** 0.688***
 [0.083] [0.056] [0.009] [0.122] [0.068] [0.108] [0.147]
IntermediateUse (−) −0.581*** 0.0751 −0.0472*** −4.827*** 0.842*** 1.765*** −11.56***
[0.080] [0.061] [0.0105] [0.160] [0.061] [0.122] [0.107]
VS    (−) 7.573*** 26.29*** −0.494*** −26.62*** −10.60*** −8.967*** −3.442***
[0.200] [0.288] [0.044] [0.516] [0.110] [0.447] [0.634]
VS1  (−) −2.917*** −28.35*** −0.350*** −9.390*** −37.59*** −24.39*** −23.22***
[0.234] [0.194] [0.0299] [0.537] [0.248] [0.620] [0.285]
z
NET/ e   (+) 0.046*** 0.007*** 0.009*** −0.013*** −0.011*** 0.137*** −0.449***
[0.002] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
N  145642 199553 275344 75930 232019 91401 119400
Partner FE 184 242 223 132 243 304 227
Within R
2 0.06 0.26 0.95 0.39 0.17 0.53 0.25
Overall R
2 0.286 0.422 0.957 0.367 0.47 0.528 0.274
Frac. Var. FE 0.194 0.295 0.0695 0.153 0.412 0.165 0.202
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. Tariff data from WITS/TRAINS. 6-digit HS level. Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing sectors.
3. Only large partners (total imports > $ 750 Mn. in 2009) included. 
4.  Data pooled across 2006-2009, except: India: 2005, 08, 09; Mexico 2005-06, 08, 09; Turkey 2005-06, 08, 09.
5. t BNDPRF is the Bound rate augmented by the Preferential rate where applicable:
    t BNDPRF = t BND, but replaced by t PRF whenever t PRF is applicable.
Table 4:  Baseline Models of Applied Bilateral TariffsARG BRA CHN IND MEX TUR ZAF
t BNDPRF 0.159*** 0.254*** 0.969*** 0.229*** 0.180*** 0.382*** 0.0996***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.0005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
 t BNDPRF × I2009 0.006 0.057*** −0.035*** −0.035*** −0.046*** 0.058*** 0.165***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005]
IIT 1.760*** 1.270*** −0.0297*** −0.359** −0.428*** −1.010*** 0.718***
[0.093] [0.064] [0.010] [0.149] [0.078] [0.130] [0.166]
IIT × I2009 −0.013 −0.195 0.0549*** −0.0683 −0.278* −0.395* 0.0124
[0.204] [0.129] [0.0205] [0.256] [0.161] [0.230] [0.350]
IntermediateUse   −0.995*** 0.385*** −0.0871*** −5.805*** 1.194*** 1.863*** −11.77***
[0.089] [0.070] [0.012] [0.189] [0.068] [0.146] [0.120]
IntermediateUse × I2009 2.399*** −1.237*** 0.158*** 3.377*** −1.704*** −0.309 2.089***
[0.200] [0.139] [0.0240] [0.350] [0.149] [0.264] [0.260]
VS 8.225*** 21.00*** −0.268*** −27.75*** −10.43*** −9.295*** −2.418***
[0.222] [0.331] [0.0515] [0.615] [0.123] [0.537] [0.715]
VS × I2009 −4.352*** 21.04*** −0.902*** 3.940*** −0.853*** 1.305 −5.358***
[0.514] [0.661] [0.102] [1.125] [0.270] [0.967] [1.517]
VS1 −3.536*** −25.74*** −0.339*** −4.428*** −38.65*** −23.48*** −23.61***
[0.262] [0.223] [0.0347] [0.645] [0.277] [0.743] [0.319]
VS1 × I2009 3.368*** −10.34*** −0.0997 −16.22*** 5.457*** −2.941** 5.649***
[0.583] [0.445] [0.0678] [1.161] [0.615] [1.344] [0.702]
z
NET/ e 0.044*** 0.006*** 0.007*** −0.013*** −0.012*** 0.152*** −0.472***
[0.002] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006]
(z
NET/e) × I2009 0.011*** 0.003** 0.009*** 0.004 0.005 −0.042*** 0.120***
[0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.008] [0.011] [0.012]
N  145642 199553 275344 75930 232019 91401 119400
Partner FE 184 242 223 132 243 304 227
Within R
2 0.07 0.27 0.95 0.39 0.17 0.53 0.25
Overall R
2
0.26 0.419 0.957 0.387 0.478 0.529 0.255
1. See Notes to Tables 3 and 4.
2. I2009 = 1 if year=2009, and zero if year ≤ 2008.
Table 5:  Tariffs Before and After 2009 (Dep. Var.: Bilateral Applied Tariff Rate in percentage points)t  0.112*** 0.0372 0.0983*** 0.103*** 0.0246 −0.174*** −0.112*** −0.130*** 0.0146 0.0144
[0.0223] [0.0246] [0.0186] [0.0192] [0.0302] [0.0615] [0.0282] [0.0298] [0.0144] [0.0240]
 t  × I2009 0.171*** 0.0793 0.260*** 0.116 0.0194
[0.0420] [0.126] [0.0651] [0.0717] [0.0309]
IIT 0.307 0.289 0.6 0.485 −2.856*** −2.910** −0.624 −0.707 0.998* −1.399
[0.560] [0.654] [0.589] [0.650] [0.949] [1.153] [0.473] [0.539] [0.545] [1.348]
IIT × I2009 0.202 1.002 0.311 0.32 3.568**
[1.275] [1.633] [2.037] [1.129] [1.492]
IntermediateUse   1.470** 2.583*** 1.523** 1.087 0.989 1.956 −1.511*** −1.813*** −2.211*** −0.878
[0.639] [0.736] [0.686] [0.715] [0.988] [1.279] [0.445] [0.495] [0.733] [0.887]
IntermediateUse × I2009 −3.014** 6.367 −2.348 1.578 −6.114***
[1.482] [7.999] [2.030] [1.200] [1.722]
VS 3.147** 5.518*** 7.620** 7.963** 5.311 10.09** −7.348*** −8.834*** −1.818 −2.345
[1.555] [1.927] [3.429] [3.533] [3.769] [4.525] [1.579] [1.769] [1.761] [2.088]
VS × I2009 −6.436* −28.17* −7.671 8.042** 7.738*
[3.337] [16.86] [7.273] [4.067] [4.010]
VS1 −4.896***−7.571*** −0.505 −0.0656 1.651 1.11 10.68*** 11.64*** 13.33*** 7.556**
[1.665] [2.005] [2.377] [2.463] [2.012] [2.705] [1.521] [1.698] [2.805] [3.624]
VS1 × I2009 5.54 7.677 0.44 −4.886 18.97***
[3.728] [10.79] [4.105] [4.208] [7.054]
z
NET/ e −0.0299 −0.0167 −0.000881 −0.000593 −0.293** −0.353** −0.0686** −0.0818** −0.064 −0.300***
[0.0380] [0.0455] [0.00934] [0.00908] [0.123] [0.142] [0.0305] [0.0352] [0.0581] [0.0748]
(z
NET/e) × I2009 −0.0722 −0.751 0.0981 0.0497 0.296***
[0.0920] [1.028] [0.216] [0.0677] [0.0824]




2 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.12
LogLik −547.7 −534.5 −398.5 −391.6 −271.2 −257.8 −580.3 −576.9 −364.3 −336.8
ModelChi2 46.07 72.5 43.19 57 49.83 76.64 92.69 99.6 34.36 89.31
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. AD data data from Bown's database at :  http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd.
3. Conditional logit drops partners with no within-variation.  Partner FE indicates how many partners have within variation.
4. AD data too sparse for ZAF to get any results.  Predicted prob for MEX=0 (i.e. marginals=0).
32839 39462 61691 25418 20465
18 18 26 22 21
Table 6:  Conditional Logit Model: Incidence of Antidumping Investigations Before and After 2009
Dependent Variable: Bilateral Antidumping Investigations (Binary)
ARG BRA CHN IND TUR2006-08 2009 2006-08 2009 2006-08 2009
Applied tariff ( t) 10.33 9.71 12.51 13.31 8.94 8.15
Bound tariff (t BND) 31.75 31.51 30.70 30.72 9.59 9.71
MFN tariff (t MFN) 12.13 11.52 13.75 14.72 9.42 9.35
pre-2009 2009 pre-2009 2009 pre-2009 2009 2006-08 2009
Applied tariff ( t) 13.42 9.78 7.26 4.80 2.16 2.25 7.73 7.30
Bound tariff (t BND) 39.24 39.04 34.97 34.99 19.81 20.45 20.55 20.58
MFN tariff (t MFN) 13.67 10.01 14.11 11.18 5.04 5.27 9.56 9.63
Note:
1. Data from WITS
2. The three pre-2009 years for the following countries are: 
      India: 2005, 2008; Mexico 2005-06, 2008; Turkey 2005-06, 2008; 
3. The import-weighted applied rate average is significantly lower for countries in PTAs.
ARG BRA CHN
TUR ZAF
Table A1:  Simple average, 6-digit HS bilateral tariffs
IND MEX